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Abstract
Context: Mutation testing and analysis is concerned with the introduction of
single faults (or errors) into a system’s design, specification, implementation
or interface and then testing or analysing the effects caused by those faults or
errors on the system’s properties and behaviour. Such faulty entities are called
mutants. Objective: This short paper sketches the idea that mutations can be
used to identify whether protocol implementations may deviate from the stan-
dards defining those protocols. Method: We apply formal analysis techniques
to analyse the harmful effects of mutations on IoT protocol specifications, most
importantly, e.g. whether those mutations will violate the IoT protocol stan-
dard. Results: We discovered in our initial investigation one interesting case
where a mutant protocol specification may lead to implementations that drop
every message intended for publication to applications without breaking the
standard of quality of message delivery in the protocol standard. Conclusion:
We believe as a result, that there is some additional investigation needed in this
direction that could be beneficial in implementing future more reliable proto-
cols and also that the current standards need to be revised to take care of such
scenarios.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mutation testing and analysis is concerned with the introduction of single
faults (or errors) into a system’s design, specification, implementation or inter-
face and then testing or analysing the effects caused by those faults or errors
on the system’s properties and behaviour. Such faulty entities are called mu-
tants. Despite the fact that mutation testing and analysis has a wide scope of
research [1], its application using formal specification and verification techniques
has remained somehow limited over the years.
In this short paper, we consider the general idea that mutations could be
used as a technique in formally understanding whether faulty implementations of
systems can pass as correct implementations in relation to the standards defining
those systems. In particular, we take the example of an Internet of Things (IoT)
protocol, namely the MQTT standard [2], and show that such cases of faulty
but nonetheless standard-compliant specifications can indeed exist. We only
demonstrate this approach to one case of MQTT, when the Quality of Service
(QoS) level of message delivery is set to 0. Unlike testing, which is incomplete,
we advocate the use of formal static analysis approaches (e.g. [3]) in order to
verify the effects mutants will have on the protocol’s message delivery semantics.
We have already shown in [4] how formal techniques can be useful for analysing
IoT protocols.
The idea of applying mutations to protocols has its roots in works such as
[5, 6]. In [5], the authors introduced the idea of mutating the nature of a message
based on the assumption that network interference is the only source of faults.
On the other hand, [6] adopt a more general approach based on a set of common
mutations that can occur during the specification of cryptographic protocols.
The type of mutations and the formal language used in [5, 6] are different from
those used in this paper. Our treatment here is motivated by mutations that
can impact the general behaviour of a system. We also advocate a more rigorous
method using process algebraic specifications in order to remove any ambiguity
about the intended behaviour.
2. Specifying IoT Protocols
The formal language we use here to model IoT protocols is the pi-calculus
process algebra [7], which has the following syntax defining processes P,Q ∈ P
based on names x, y ∈ N :
P,Q ::= x〈y〉.P | x(y).P | !P | (νx)P | (P |Q) | (P+Q) | 0 | A(x)
The input actions, x(y).P , synchronises with suitable output actions x〈y〉.P .
The other constructs include process replication !P , new name creation (νx)P ,
parallel composition (P | Q), non-deterministic choice (P + Q) and the null
process 0. Finally, we utilise process definition calls in the form of A(x) to pass
the value of some input x to a process A defined as A(y)
def
= P , where x will
replace y in P . If the definition A does not accept any input parameters, then
we simply omit the input parameter y and write A()
def
= P .
We give here one example for the model of the MQTT QoS=0 protocol [2]:
Protocol()
def
= (!((νPublish)Client(Publish))) | !Server() where,
Client(z)
def
= c〈z〉.0 and Server() def= c(x).pub〈x〉.0
In this protocol, the Client continuously creates new messages (Publish) (e.g.
related to some topic of interest) that it outputs on a channel c, which is then
received at the Server. The Server, in turn, outputs this message on another
channel called pub on which a Subscriber is listening.
Our model of the subscribers is minimal where the Subscriber simply only
(repeatedly) consumes the published messages after which it terminates:
Subscriber()
def
= !(pub(x′).0)
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It is worth noting here that publish/subscribe systems have been modelled
in the past using process algebra, e.g. as in [8].
3. Generating Mutations
Mutations can include various types of alterations to the syntax of processes,
but for brevity, we give here only three examples of such alterations.
3.1. Free Name Changes
These include alterations of a single free name in a process. For example,
this would result in the Client process above mutating to d〈z〉.0 and c〈q〉.0, and
the Server process to d(x).pub〈x〉.0 and c(x).pub′〈x〉.0, where pub 6= pub′. Such
alterations may be due to network interference changing messages’ content or
bad implementations changing communication channel addresses.
3.2. Action Changes
Another kind of mutations that one may consider are modifications to single
actions in a process. Such alterations can in reality represent the wrong choice
or misconfiguration of a device or a software component, where the behaviour
(input/output) is not as expected in the specification. In our example, the
Client process could be changed to the mutants c(y).0, d(y).0 and d〈q〉.0, and
the Server process changed to d〈q〉.pub〈x〉.0, c〈q〉.pub〈x〉.0, c(x).pub(y).0 and
c(x).pub′(y).0. As discussed in the next section, the third client mutant, d〈q〉.0,
is an interesting case as it can cause data to be sent to the wrong server.
3.3. Process Operator Changes
These mutations include single changes to process operators, which can ex-
press bad compositions of the various components of a system’s implementation.
For the Client process, this would result in the mutants c〈z〉+0 and c〈z〉 | 0, and
for the Server process, the mutants (c(x).0) + (pub〈x〉.0), (c(x).0) | (pub〈x〉.0),
c(x).((pub〈x〉.0)+0) and c(x).((pub〈x〉.0) | 0). As we discuss in the next section,
this last mutation has a denial-of-service impact on the subscribers expecting
to obtain data from the server.
4. Initial Findings and Conclusion
As an initial investigation, we applied formal static analysis techniques, de-
veloped in [3] to capture message substitution in communicating processes, to
analyse harmful effects of our mutations on the MQTT clients and servers.
Our approach considers a mutant to be harmful if it causes unsafe/insecure
behaviour in the protocol, which does not violate the protocol’s standard QoS
semantics and hence the mutant can be implemented without any issues.
We can summarise our initial findings as follows:
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• Case of free name changes. These changes produced some potentially
dangerous mutants such as c(x).pub′〈x〉.0, where the Server outputs the
message to the wrong Subscriber, and d(x).pub〈x〉.0, where the message
is inputted from the wrong Client. However, such mutations violate the
MQTT definition of communications and can therefore be prevented in
MQTT implementations.
• Case of action changes. The main mutant here was the client process
d〈q〉.0, which has the potential of outputting some data q to the wrong
server communicating over channel d. This is dangerous since the server
listening on d may be unauthorised, and if q is some sensitive internal
data that must not be revealed (e.g. an encryption key). Again, such
mutations violate the protocol’s specification and are therefore preventable
in implementations.
• Case of process operator changes. Our major finding was in the case
of the mutant c(x).(pub〈x〉.0 + 0), where we find that the Server process
has a choice between publishing the inputted message to the Subscriber
or doing nothing. Worse, it may always wish to opt for 0 ignoring to
ever publish any messages. This behaviour does not violate the MQTT
QoS=0 quality standard since the mutant Server process turns itself into a
process that “simulates” a lossy network, which is behaviour that QoS=0
is willing to tolerate. We consider such a mutant to be implementing
a form of denial-of-service, since it is conceptually a server and not a
network, and therefore it should attempt to deliver any data generated
by the clients. The same issue is implicitly present in c(x).(pub〈x〉.0 | 0)
since parallelism can be interpreted with non-deterministic choice as was
shown in [9].
For future work, we plan to develop the algorithms underlying the mutations
above and to apply these along with the static analysis techniques of [3] on the
other two MQTT protocols, namely QoS=1 and QoS=2, in order to provide
a complete study. We also plan to apply our mutation analysis approach to
other communication protocols, including other IoT protocols. Finally, there is
currently no automatic way in comparing the traces of a mutated process with
the original one in order to reason on whether the former is violating the latter.
We plan to investigate this direction further, by formalising a trace refinement
relationship akin to that introduced in [10].
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